According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain-the switch model-according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of the split-brain syndrome is not a new one-such projects date back to Nagel's seminal paper on the topic-the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of the issues.
inability to detect any cognitive impairments arising from the operation.
5 However, subsequent research has revealed a complex array of deficits-and the occasional benefit-in the split-brain. 6 It is this research that gives rise to the view that split-brain patients have a disunified consciousness.
In a typical split-brain experiment, two stimuli are presented to the patient in such a way that one will be processed by the left hemisphere and the other by the right hemisphere.
For example, the word 'key-ring' might be projected such that 'key' is restricted to the patient's left visual field (LVF) and 'ring' is restricted to the patient's right visual field (RVF). The contralateral structure of the visual system ensures that stimuli projected to the LVF are processed in the right hemisphere and vice-versa. Other perceptual systems can be studied in a similar manner. For example, tactile perception is examined by asking the patient to compare, either by verbal report or by pointing, objects presented to each hand.
Such studies have revealed two kinds of disunities in the split-brain: behavioral disunities and representational disunities. Behavioral disunities are most striking. When asked to report what she sees the patient in the key-ring experiment will typically say that she sees only the word 'ring'; yet, with her left hand, the patient may select a picture of a key and ignore pictures of both a ring and a key-ring. Generally speaking, visual information projected to the RVF cannot be verbally reported, and visual information projected to the LVF is unavailable for behavior involving the right hand. In the tactile modality, the patient cannot describe, or use her right hand to respond to, objects palpitated by her left hand, and objects palpitated by the right hand cannot be reported via left-handed actions.
Representational disunities involve a lack of integration between the contents of the patient's conscious states. These states do not enjoy the inferential promiscuity that conscious states typically enjoy. The patient in the key-ring experiment appears to have representations of the words 'key' and 'ring' without having a representation of the word 'key-ring'. Similarly, a patient might appear to be conscious of the identity of the objects palpitated by each hand but have no conjoint awareness of both objects. As we shall see, the precise nature of behavioral and representational disunities differs from patient to patient, but the foregoing description captures the core features of the split-brain syndrome.
II. The unity of consciousness
Whether or not the split-brain syndrome is at odds with the unity of consciousness clearly depends on what it is for consciousness to be unified. There are a number of things that might be meant by "the unity of consciousness", only some of which are called into question by the split-brain syndrome. This section provides a brief overview of the conception of the unity of consciousness with which I will work.
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The kind of consciousness in which I am interested is phenomenal consciousness. States of phenomenal consciousness are characterized by the fact that there is something it is like to be in them. Typically, we enjoy multiple phenomenal states at a time. I currently have visual experiences associated with seeing these words on a computer screen, auditory experiences of the sounds associated with the café in which I am sitting, a range of bodily sensations, emotional and mood experiences, experiences of agency, and conscious cognitive states of various kinds. Perhaps there is no point in time at which my overall phenomenal perspective includes experiences drawn from each of these categories, but there are certainly times at which I enjoy a number of these phenomenal states at once. consciousness; there is no single thing that it is like to be such a subject.
The split-brain data suggests that split-brain patients do not enjoy a unified consciousness, for it appears as though there are times at which the split-brain patient has no total phenomenal state. Of course, this pressure can be relieved by individuating subjects of experience in phenomenal terms; one might say that where an organism has two total phenomenal states it also has (or supports) two subjects of experience. Those tempted by this move will claim that any evidence for thinking that split-brain patients have a disunified consciousness is evidence not that such patients have a disunified consciousness but that split-brain patients are not themselves conscious subjects.
There is much to be said on behalf of this response but it can be set to one side here, for I will argue that there is no time at which the split-brain patient has a disunified consciousness. We need not individuate subjects of experience in phenomenal terms in order to 'save' the unity of consciousness from the split-brain syndrome. At least, so I will argue.
III. The case for phenomenal disunity
Disunity models of the split-brain regard the split-brain patient as having simultaneous, but phenomenally disunified, experiences. I will examine two lines of argument for this view of the split-brain, each of which proceeds on the assumption that in the key-ring experiment (and others like it) the patient has representations of the stimuli that are both simultaneous and conscious. I will revisit the assumption of simultaneity in section IV, but 6 for now let us proceed by accepting it. What about the assumption that the split-brain patient's mental states are conscious?
Early treatments of the split-brain sometimes presented the minor (typically right) hemisphere as a zombie, conscious neither of its environment nor of its own behavior.
This view was sometimes defended on the grounds that consciousness in the split-brain (and perhaps more generally) is restricted to the language-generating left hemisphere.
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This defense cannot be supported. For one thing, a number of split-brain patients have some capacity for both LH and RH speech production.
9 More importantly, we should not make language production-or, for that matter, language comprehension-a precondition on the possession of consciousness; such a principle would, implausibly, remove prelinguistic children and aphasics from the realm of the conscious. Even the claim that creatures capable of producing verbal reports must be able to report the contents of each of their conscious states is unacceptably demanding.
One might attempt to defend the zombie model by assimilating right-hemisphere guided behavior to other instances of non-conscious behavior, such as on-line dorsal stream motor control in the visual system, or high-level automaticity effects as studied in social The first argument for phenomenal disunity appeals to the connection between phenomenal unity and representational content. Consider a split-brain patient (S) in the key-ring experiment. S has two experiences, one of which represents the word 'key' and one of which represents the word 'ring', but it seems clear that S does not have an experience of the word 'key-ring'. But-so the argument goes-any subject with phenomenally unified experiences of the words 'key' and 'ring' must also have an experience of the word 'key-ring'. Since S has no such experience, we should conclude that S's experiences of 'key' and 'ring' are not phenomenally unified. Call this the closure argument.
As stated, the closure argument is unconvincing. We must distinguish experiences with the content <'key-ring'> from experiences with the content <'key' & 'ring'>. To see a stimulus as the word 'key-ring' goes beyond seeing it as containing the words 'key' and 'ring'. But this objection is far from fatal, for there is no more reason to suppose that S has an experience with the content <'key' & 'ring'> than there is to suppose that S has an experience with the content <'key-ring'>. After all, S shows no indication-either by verbal report or manual behaviour-of having seen the words 'key' and 'ring'. Sperling's data is contested, arguably it provides some reason to think that subjects can be conscious of more than they can report.
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But there are problems with Bayne and Chalmers's proposal. Firstly, subjects in the Sperling case have a kind of meta-access to their putatively "unreportable" contents, for they report that they were aware of more than they could directly report. Split-brain patients produce no such reports; unlike Sperling's subjects, they do not say that they had fleeting "unreportable" experiences. Furthermore, one cannot appeal to processing bottlenecks to explain why the patient cannot use the contents of her representation of 'key' in ways in which she can use her representation of 'ring' and vice-versa, for it seems unlikely that saying 'key' or picking out a ring with one's left hand presents more of a challenge to consuming systems than does saying 'ring' or picking out a key.
Let us return to the closure argument. The argument can be presented as follows:
(1) S has experiences with contents <A> and <B>.
(2) S does not have an experience with content <A&B>.
Therefore, S's experiences with contents <A> and <B> are not phenomenally unified.
There is clearly a missing premise here. We can tighten the argument up by appealing to the following principle:
Closure: Necessarily, if a subject (S) has an experience with content <A> and an experience with content <B>, and these experiences are phenomenally unified with each other, then S has an experience with content <A&B>.
Closure is not incontrovertible. One could treat phenomenal unity as a primitive relation that has no implications for the representational relations between the contents of those states that it unifies. 14 Nonetheless, closure is appealing. I am inclined to think that experiences are phenomenally unified only when they stand in a certain relation- the contents of A and B. In the case of states with contents <A> and <B>, the best candidate for a subsuming state will be a state with content <A&B>. In short, closure, and with it the closure argument, is highly plausible.
A second argument for phenomenal disunity in the split-brain involves an appeal to behavioral unity, or rather, the lack thereof.
(1) S's representations of 'key' and 'ring' are not behaviorally unified: although the contents of both states are available for high-level consumption, they are not available to the same consuming systems.
(2) Phenomenal unity entails behavioral unity: two experiences cannot be phenomenally unified without being behaviorally unified.
(C) So, S has simultaneous but phenomenally disunified experiences.
The crucial premise would appear to be (2). Does behaviorally disunity entail phenomenal disunity?
As we noted in the previous section, there is some reason to think that the contents of consciousness need not be globally available for high-level control. And if that is right, then it is possible that the contents of phenomenally unified conscious states might be available for different forms of high-level control-that is, they might not be behaviorally unified. Let us examine two syndromes in which behavioral unity seems to break down.
Children participating in the Dimensional Change Card Sort task are asked to sort a series of cards (e.g. red rabbits and blue dogs) into piles according to a certain dimension (e.g. colour). 15 Having sorted several cards, the children are then told to switch the sorting rule, say, from colors to animals. Three year-olds typically fail to switch dimensions when instructed to do so, but they usually respond correctly to questions about what they ought to be doing. Their verbal behaviour suggests that they are conscious of the post-switch
rules, yet the content of this state does not seem to be available to drive their sorting behaviour.
The Dimensional Change Card Sort task involves cognitive states. Of more direct relevance to the interpretation of the split-brain data is evidence that perceptual states are not always globally available for cognitive consumption. Subjects in metacontrast experiments are presented with a series of letters in a format designed to "mask" some of the stimuli. In one such experiment, subjects were instructed to press one key if they saw 15 See P. D. Zelazo, "An Age-Related Dissociation Between Knowing Rules and Using Them,"
Cognitive Development, 11 (1996): 37-63. the letter J (for example) and another key if they failed to see a J. 16 When urged to respond as quickly as possible subjects tended to respond to the occurrence of a target letter in the 'blanked' (masked) positions with a fast (and correct) press of the 'target present' key, only to immediately apologize for having made an error. 17 Arguably, these subjects had experiences whose contents were available to some forms of behavioral control (manual button-pressing) but not others (verbal report).
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Nonetheless, even if behavioral disunity does not entail phenomenal disunity, it does seem reasonable to regard it as a good guide to phenomenal disunity. In general, the best explanation of the fact that the contents of conscious states are not available to the same consuming systems is likely to be that they are not phenomenally unified. And, in light of this, the behavioral disunity argument surely has some weight.
I have examined two arguments for the claim that split-brain patients are phenomenally disunified: the closure argument and the behavioral disunity argument. Each argument has considerable merit, and their combined force does much to justify disunity accounts of the split-brain. So let us temporarily proceed on that assumption that the split-brain patient is phenomenally disunified. The question we must now address is whether the split-brain subject has two separate streams of consciousness or a single, partially unified, stream of consciousness.
IV. The two-streams model
It is frequently said that split-brain patients have two streams of consciousness.
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However, the two-streams moniker has been applied to a variety of views. Here, I take the two-streams model to hold that at any one time phenomenal states in the split-brain patient can be divided into two sets, A and B, where states within each set are mutually phenomenally unified but no state within either set is phenomenally unified with any state in the other set.
The two streams model draws support from standard presentations of the split-brain data of the kind I gave in section I. Such presentations encourage one to conceive of the split-brain operation as bisecting a single global workspace into two (less global) workspaces, one per hemisphere.
Unfortunately for the two-streams model, there is rather more integration in the split-brain than this picture would predict. Although the details of inter-hemispheric integration vary from patient to patient, almost all split-brain patients show some degree of inter-hemispheric integration. These data problematize the two-streams model, for they suggest that the split-brain patient has experiences that 'straddle' both hemispheres. Such bilateral experiences would be phenomenally unified with both right hemisphere and left hemisphere experiences, in opposition to the thought that the patient's two streams of consciousness are sealed off form each other.
In response, the two-streams theorist might be tempted to argue that apparently bilateral possible for a conscious subject to have, simultaneously, two experiences with exactly the same content. I shall argue below that the duplication assumption is problematic.
Behavioral integration in experimental contexts also poses challenges for the two-streams view. In the typical split-brain experiment, the patient's right-handed behavior accords with her verbal reports and differs from her left-handed behavior. However, in some experiments the patient's right-handed behavior accords with her left-handed behavior, both of which are at odds with her verbal reports. 23 Furthermore, some patients (e.g. LB)
can name LVF stimuli without being able to integrate stimuli between the two visual hemi-fields, whereas others (e.g. NG) can integrate stimuli between the two visual hemifields but cannot name LVF stimuli. 24 Again, these findings suggest that the availability of content to systems of cognitive consumption in the split-brain is a messy and somewhat fragmented affair, rather than one in which there is a clean division between two clearly demarcated workspaces.
Of course, there are various ways in which one might attempt to account for interhemispheric behavioral integration within the two-streams framework. Each hemisphere has some degree of bilateral motor control, and many split-brain patients have at least some right-hemisphere capacity to comprehend and produce language. In the light of this, the two-streamer could argue that (say) left-handed responses involve a consuming system that has access to both left and right hemisphere streams of consciousness. More perspicuously, perhaps, the two-streamer might regard left-handed responses as involving different consuming systems depending on whether or not they are guided by the right hemisphere or the left hemisphere. There are certainly questions to be asked here about just how consuming systems-and cognitive workspaces more generally-ought to be individuated, but I doubt that such moves can save the two-streams model. In fact, they are likely to look increasingly ad hoc as the two-streamer is forced to individuate consuming systems so as to preserve the account rather than on any principled (or even intuitive) basis. A further objection to the two-streams model concerns everyday integration in the splitbrain. How could someone with two streams of consciousness exhibit the kind of behavioral unity that split-brain patients demonstrate in their day-to-day lives? Some two-streamers meet this objection by suggesting that split-brain patients have two streams of consciousness only in experimental conditions. 25 The main challenge for this contextualist response is to explain how the structure of the patient's consciousness might be altered by the transition between everyday and experimental environments given that phenomenal structure supervenes only on neural structure and neural structure seems not to be fundamentally altered by moving between everyday and experimental contexts.
Of course, the contextualist could deny that phenomenal structure does supervene on neural structure. The contextualist might follow Hurley in identifying the unity of consciousness with a "dynamic singularity in the field of causal flows that is centered on but not bounded by a biological organism" (Consciousness in Action, p. 207). 26 But even those one are attracted to Hurley's vehicle externalism need to explain how the transition between everyday and experimental contexts has an impact on the structure of consciousness. The contextualist might argue that the cognitive demands (uniquely)
imposed by experimental conditions alter the patient's neural dynamics in such a way that the patient's single stream of consciousness is caused to bifurcate into two streams, whereas relaxing those cognitive demands allows these two streams to be reunified.
Although we do not know enough about the neural basis of consciousness to rule this proposal out, it does not seem to me to be a promising one. After all, high cognitive load does not normally bifurcate the stream of consciousness, so why should it do so in the context of the split-brain syndrome?
Rather than going contextualist, most two-streamers attempt to account for everyday behavioural unity in the split-brain by deploying the duplication gambit. 27 They hold that the ability of patients to orient at will to salient stimuli allows them to enjoy duplicate experiences-that is, distinct phenomenal states with the same content, one in each conscious stream. Some proponents of the duplication gambit might be tempted to deny that apparent duplicates would belong to the same subject of experience. Perhaps in sectioning the corpus callosum we have also created two subjects of experience. I have some sympathy with this response, but I am assuming here that the split-brain patient is but one conscious subject, whether or not he or she lacks a unified consciousness. Note, moreover, that few two-streamers will want to save the duplication gambit in this way, for most are committed to the claim that both streams of consciousness belong to a single subject of experience.
But why insist on the tripartite account of experience? Why should the proponent of the duplication gambit not individuate experiences in (say) neural terms? Perhaps a subject can have multiple tokens of the same experiential type at the same time as long as the two states occur in (supervene on, are grounded in) different neural areas.
Although the issues surrounding the tripartite account are complex, it seems to me that we have good reason to retain it in some form. Perhaps the most potent motivation for retaining the tripartite account is phenomenological. In summary, neither of the strategies deployed by two-streamers to account for everyday behavioral integration in the split-brain is promising. The two-streams model may represent the conventional wisdom on the split-brain, but it does not deserve that status.
V. Partial unity
Grappling with the difficulties posed by the data, Nagel suggested that perhaps there is no whole number of minds that split-brain patients enjoy (ibid, p. 410). One way to develop Nagel's proposal is in the direction of Lockwood's partial unity model, according to which split-brain subjects have simultaneous experiences (e 1 , e 2 and e 3 ) such that e 1 and e 2 are each phenomenally unified with e 3 but not with each other. 32 The partial unity model attempts to capture the fact that split-brain subjects show too much unity to be thought of as having two completely separate streams of consciousness, yet too little unity to be ascribed a single fully unified consciousness.
As we saw in the previous section, the 'raw' split-brain data seem to favor the partial unity model over its two-stream rival. Far from clustering into two autonomous systems, perception and cognition in the split-brain is inter-hemispherically integrated in various ways (see also section VI.). But if the data themselves point to the partial unity model why has it had so few proponents?
I suspect that neglect of the partial unity models is almost entirely due to concerns about its intelligibility: consciousness, so the thought goes, cannot be partially unified. Even
Michael Lockwood, to whom we owe the model, admits to having doubts about its coherence. 33 I share Lockwood's doubts, but care must be taken in how they are put. It is sometimes suggested that the problem with the partial unity model is that we cannot imagine what it would be like to have a partially unified consciousness. This, it seems to me, is not the real issue here. 34 The phenomenal perspective of a partial unified subject may not be imaginatively accessible (to us, at least), but it would be the height of hubris to suppose that the limits of what we can imagine are the limits of phenomenal possibility.
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The real objection to the partial unity model concerns not its unimaginability but its inconceivability. Contrast the perspective of a partially unified subject with that of a bat.
Although the phenomenal perspective of a bat is not imaginatively accessible to us, we have no difficulty grasping the thought that there is something it is like to be a bat. By contrast, we do have difficulties-arguably great difficulties-in grasping the thought that consciousness could be partially unified. Arguably, first-person acquaintance with consciousness reveals that simultaneous phenomenal states that are unified with a third (simultaneous) experience must be unified with each other.
This line of argument will not convince everyone. Some theorists will not share the intuition that partial unity is impossible, others will put little stock in inconceivability intuitions (at least when they involve consciousness), and even those who both share the intuition that partial unity is impossible and who are prepared to grant it some epistemic weight might regard its force as being outweighed by the empirical considerations in favor of the model. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the apparent inconceivability of partial unity goes some way towards undermining its appeal. We ought to be reluctant to accept a model of the split-brain that is of dubious coherence.
It is time to recap. Not only does the two-streams model receive only equivocal support from the experimental data, it has trouble accounting for the everyday behavioral integration of split-brain patients. The partial unity models fares better with respect to the experimental data, and arguably has less difficulty accounting for everyday integration in 34 Dainton 2000: p. 98; Lockwood, Mind, Brain and the Quantum, p. 92; C. Peacocke, "Introduction:
The Issues and their Further Development," in C. Peacocke (ed.) Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. xx. 35 Hurley also argues that the (un)imaginability objection to the partial unity model fail, but her argument depends on the rejection of "what it's like" accounts of phenomenal unity ('coconsciousness' in her terminology). This is problematic, for phenomenal unity is defined in what it's like terms. Indeed, Hurley herself introduces the notion of co-consciousness by saying that experiences are co-conscious when they are "together or united within one consciousness"
("Action, the Unity of Consciousness, and Vehicle Externalism," p. 72).
the split-brain, but its very coherence is questionable. Perhaps we should reconsider the possibility that split-brain patients retain a unified consciousness.
VI. The switch model
In an important series of split-brain experiments, Levy and collaborators presented chimeric stimuli -that is, stimuli created by conjoining two similar half-stimuli at the vertical midline -to a series of split-brain patients. 36 On some trials patients were instructed to point to the figure that matched the stimulus, whilst on other trials patients were required to name the stimulus.
For all patients examined, and for tasks including the perception of faces, nonsense shapes, picture of common objects, patterns of Xs and squares, words, word meaning, phonetic images of rhyming pictures, and outline drawings to be matched to colors, patients gave one response on the vast majority of competitive trials. In general, inter-hemispheric activation will march in step with changes in the subject's attentional focus. Rapid inter-hemispheric switches will generate the impression that the patient is conscious of much more than she is in fact conscious of-in much the same way,
perhaps, that our fluid interaction with the environment generates the impression that we are conscious of more than we are.
From the perspective of the switch model, we can now see that the closure and behavioral disunity arguments go wrong in assuming that the patient is simultaneously conscious of 'key' and 'ring'. The patient might be conscious of the word 'key' (due to right hemisphere activation), and she might be conscious of the word 'ring' (due to left hemisphere activation), but she will not be conscious of both 'key' and 'ring' at the same time, even when the two words are presented simultaneously. The patient's behaviour might suggest that she is simultaneously conscious of both stimuli, but this would be an illusion generated by the rapidity with which her attention switches between hemispheres.
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In their original report of the chimeric studies, Levy and co-authors ascribed a nonexpressed conscious state to the non-responding hemisphere on the grounds that the patient could be encouraged to report (or express) its percept simply by changing the response required of the subject. 39 However, they came to regard this modulation in responses as facilitating the entry into consciousness of previously unconscious content, rather than merely allowing the patient to access hitherto inaccessible experiences. In other examples of response-dependent processing, Levy and Trevarthen found that requiring patients to match chimeric stimuli based on their visual appearance favored the LVF (that is, RH processing) whereas instructions to match chimeric stimuli based on their function favored the RVF (that is, LH processing). 40 Arguably, however, consciousness is not shuttled between hemispheres by response-demands per se but by the redistribution of attention that such changes bring about. was hidden by a white strip, the purpose of which was to hinder detection of the incongruity between the two sides of the stimulus. At 100 ms exposure normal subjects had great difficulty detecting that the stimuli were chimeric. On trials in which no awareness of asymmetry was present, the subjects indicated (either manually or verbally) only one face, which was always perceived as complete. Furthermore, Milner and Dunne's subjects manifested response-dependent processing akin to that seen in Levy's experiment, with verbal responses favouring RVF stimuli and left-handed responses favouring LVF stimuli. One could take this study to show that normal subjects have two streams of consciousness under these experimental conditions, but it seems to me more reasonable to conclude that even in the normal brain visual experience can switch between hemispheres.
as "largely integrated." 42 Gazzaniga's assessment was perhaps an over-simplification, but there is evidence that many attentional systems remain unified in the split-brain. 43 An early study by Krueter et al. 44 concluded that "a maximum effort by one hemisphere does withdraw capacity from the other, an effect which in the absence of the corpus callosum is presumably mediated by a 'capacity distributing system' located in the brain stem" (ibid., p. 460). More recently, Holtxman and Gazzaniga showed that cognitive load in one splitbrain hemisphere can interfere with performance in the other hemisphere. 45 Lambert has argued that there is a single system of selective attention in the split-brain, 46 while Pashler and co-authors 47 concluded that "even after commissurotomy the left and right
The switch model also acquires indirect support from a wide range of evidence-drawn from studies of coma, the minimally conscious state, anaesthesia and hydranencephelic children-that identifies sub-cortical systems, centered on the thalamus, as playing a crucial role in consciousness. 48 These systems are not divided in the split-brain patient, which might explain not only how consciousness could switch between hemispheres but also why split-brain patients, unlike cetaceans, have a single sleep-wake cycle.
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I conclude by considering two objections to the switch model. If, as the switch model asserts, split-brain patients often undergo sudden and radical changes in the contents of their experience, why are they not aware of this? After all, subjects who experience alterations in the contents of consciousness (as in binocular rivalry) are normally aware of those alterations. Split-brain patients occasionally report sudden changes in the contents of consciousness, but such comments are rare. Why might this be?
One possibility is that inter-hemispheric switches in consciousness might themselves be unusual outside of experimental contexts. Perhaps split-brain patients generally get by on one-presumably the left-conscious hemisphere. Experimenters often remark on the need to actively elicit the participation of right-hemisphere processing in the split-brain.
Even when the right hemisphere initiates a task the left frequently takes over and attempts to complete it, sometimes to the detriment of the patient's performance. 50 response to this question, but there is some comfort to be had in the fact that disorders of consciousness are often accompanied by 'introspective blindness'. In their famous study of unilateral neglect, Bisiach and Luzzati asked to patients to imagine themselves standing in Milan's Piazza del Duomo with their back to the cathedral. 51 As predicted, they failed to describe the buildings on the left. But when asked immediately afterwards to describe when they would see if looking at the cathedral from the opposite end of the square, the same patients named the previously neglected buildings and neglected those that they had just mentioned. At no point did the patients attempt to integrate their successive reports, nor did they express any concern about the obvious inconsistency between them.
Just as the ability to track perceptual continuity may be impaired by the very damage that causes unilateral neglect, so too the ability to detect interhemispheric changes in the contents of consciousness may be undermined by the very procedure that prevents consciousness from being bilaterally distributed. It is one thing for the contents of one's consciousness to switch, it is another to be conscious of switches in conscious content.
A second objection concerns not the truth of the switch model per se but rather the claim that it is consistent with the unity of consciousness. I have presented the switch model in terms of a single stream of consciousness switching between hemispheres, but a critic might reply that the switch model is better described in terms of the possession of two streams of consciousness that are activated only sequentially. Thus, the critic might continue, far from vindicating the claim that consciousness remains unified in the splitbrain, the switch model actually undermines it.
This objection returns us to the question of what it is for consciousness to be unified.
According to the account formulated in section II, all it takes for a subject to have a unified consciousness at a time is the existence of a single phenomenal state (or phenomenal field) that subsumes each of the subject's experiences at that time. As far as I can see, there is nothing in the critic's redescription of the switch scenario that is at odds with this account.
Of course, the critic might retort that even if the switch model is consistent with the unity of consciousness, there is a sense in which it is at odds with the continuity of consciousness: in order for a subject to have a single stream of consciousness during a particular interval, that subject's experiences must be grounded in a single set of consciousness-generating mechanisms. And, so the critic continues, this condition is not met if consciousness alternates between left and right hemispheres. 
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There is something to the claim that the continuity of consciousness requires physical continuity of some kind, although spelling out just what kind of continuity is required is not easy. No matter, for there is good reason to think that the switch model is consistent with any plausible continuity requirement. I presented the switch model as holding that consciousness in the split-brain switches between hemispheres, but this is true only to a first approximation. Two important qualifications must be made. Firstly, some forms of conscious content, such as affective content, involve sub-cortical systems that are not separated by the split-brain procedure. The mechanisms responsible for such states constitute a form of physical continuity that underlies inter-hemispheric switches.
Secondly, we should not think of the cortical mechanisms responsible for the content of consciousness as the mechanisms of consciousness per se. Arguably, cortical activity does not generate consciousness under its own steam, but contributes to the contents of consciousness only when integrated with sub-cortical processing. Again, these subcortical networks can provide any physical continuity that might be required for the continuity of consciousness.
VII. Conclusion
Although few contemporary theories would follow the 17 th Century anatomist Giovanni Lancisi in identifying the corpus callosum as the seat of the soul, it is widely assumed that splitting the corpus callosum also splits consciousness. The burden of this paper has been to undermine this dogma. I have attempted to loosen the grip that disunity models of the split-brain have on us, and to present the switch model as a live alternative to them. Not only does it do better in accounting for the behavior of split-brain patients in both experimental and everyday contexts, it also avoids the philosophical baggage that accompanies the two-streams and partial unity models.
I leave open the question of whether consciousness is necessarily unified. Even if consciousness in the split-brain syndrome remains unified, it is possible that the unity of consciousness breaks down in the context of other pathologies of consciousness; and, of course, it is possible that the unity of consciousness might fail in non-human animals. All that can be said at this stage is that the case against the unity of consciousness remains unproven.
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